Daily Papers

Recent Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been challenged by the computational overhead resulting from massive video frames, often alleviated through compression strategies. However, the visual content is not equally contributed to user instructions, existing strategies (\eg, average pool) inevitably lead to the loss of potentially useful information. To tackle this, we propose the Hybrid-level Instruction Injection Strategy for Conditional Token Compression in MLLMs (HICom), utilizing the instruction as a condition to guide the compression from both local and global levels. This encourages the compression to retain the maximum amount of user-focused information while reducing visual tokens to minimize computational burden. Specifically, the instruction condition is injected into the grouped visual tokens at the local level and the learnable tokens at the global level, and we conduct the attention mechanism to complete the conditional compression. From the hybrid-level compression, the instruction-relevant visual parts are highlighted while the temporal-spatial structure is also preserved for easier understanding of LLMs. To further unleash the potential of HICom, we introduce a new conditional pre-training stage with our proposed dataset HICom-248K. Experiments show that our HICom can obtain distinguished video understanding ability with fewer tokens, increasing the performance by 2.43\% average on three multiple-choice QA benchmarks and saving 78.8\% tokens compared with the SOTA method. The code is available at https://github.com/lntzm/HICom.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

Despite their remarkable performance, large language models lack elementary safety features, making them susceptible to numerous malicious attacks. In particular, previous work has identified the absence of an intrinsic separation between instructions and data as the root cause of the success of prompt injection attacks. In this work, we propose a new architectural element, ASIDE, that allows language models to clearly separate instructions and data at the level of token embeddings. ASIDE applies an orthogonal rotation to the embeddings of data tokens, thus creating clearly distinct representations of instructions and data tokens without introducing any additional parameters. As we demonstrate experimentally across a range of models, instruction-tuning LLMs with ASIDE (1) achieves substantially higher instruction-data separation without performance loss and (2) makes the models more robust to prompt injection benchmarks, even without dedicated safety training. Additionally, we provide insights into the mechanism underlying our method through an analysis of the model representations. The source code and training scripts are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/aside.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Production-grade LLM systems require robust adherence to dozens or even hundreds of instructions simultaneously. However, the instruction-following capabilities of LLMs at high instruction densities have not yet been characterized, as existing benchmarks only evaluate models on tasks with a single or few instructions. We introduce IFScale, a simple benchmark of 500 keyword-inclusion instructions for a business report writing task to measure how instruction-following performance degrades as instruction density increases. We evaluate 20 state-of-the-art models across seven major providers and find that even the best frontier models only achieve 68% accuracy at the max density of 500 instructions. Our analysis reveals model size and reasoning capability to correlate with 3 distinct performance degradation patterns, bias towards earlier instructions, and distinct categories of instruction-following errors. Our insights can help inform design of instruction-dense prompts in real-world applications and highlight important performance-latency tradeoffs. We open-source the benchmark and all results for further analysis at https://distylai.github.io/IFScale.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

This paper provides a self-contained, from-scratch, exposition of key algorithms for instruction tuning of models: SFT, Rejection Sampling, REINFORCE, Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO), Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Explanations of these algorithms often assume prior knowledge, lack critical details, and/or are overly generalized and complex. Here, each method is discussed and developed step by step using simplified and explicit notation focused on LLMs, aiming to eliminate ambiguity and provide a clear and intuitive understanding of the concepts. By minimizing detours into the broader RL literature and connecting concepts to LLMs, we eliminate superfluous abstractions and reduce cognitive overhead. Following this exposition, we provide a literature review of new techniques and approaches beyond those detailed. Finally, new ideas for research and exploration in the form of GRAPE (Generalized Relative Advantage Policy Evolution) are presented.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Instruction tuning is instrumental in enabling Large Language Models~(LLMs) to follow user instructions to complete various open-domain tasks. The success of instruction tuning depends on the availability of high-quality instruction data. Owing to the exorbitant cost and substandard quality of human annotation, recent works have been deeply engaged in the exploration of the utilization of powerful closed-source models to generate instruction data automatically. However, these methods carry potential risks arising from the usage requirements of powerful closed-source models, which strictly forbid the utilization of their outputs to develop machine learning models. To deal with this problem, in this work, we explore alternative approaches to generate high-quality instruction data that do not rely on closed-source models. Our exploration includes an investigation of various existing instruction generation methods, culminating in the integration of the most efficient variant with two novel strategies to enhance the quality further. Evaluation results from two benchmarks and the GPT-4 model demonstrate the effectiveness of our generated instruction data, which can outperform Alpaca, a method reliant on closed-source models. We hope that more progress can be achieved in generating high-quality instruction data without using closed-source models.

With contributions from the open-source community, a vast amount of instruction tuning (IT) data has emerged. Given the significant resource allocation required for training and evaluating models, it is advantageous to have an efficient method for selecting high-quality IT data. However, existing methods for instruction data selection have limitations such as relying on fragile external APIs, being affected by biases in GPT models, or reducing the diversity of the selected instruction dataset. In this paper, we propose an industrial-friendly, expert-aligned and diversity-preserved instruction data selection method: Clustering and Ranking (CaR). CaR employs a two-step process: first, it ranks instruction pairs using a high-accuracy (84.25%) scoring model aligned with expert preferences; second, it preserves dataset diversity through clustering. In our experiment, CaR efficiently selected a mere 1.96% of Alpaca's IT data, yet the resulting AlpaCaR model surpassed Alpaca's performance by an average of 32.1% in GPT-4 evaluations. Moreover, we find that data selecting is a consistent paradigm whether the pre-trained model is more capable or the model parameters scaling up. Our approach employs compact models with 550M parameters and incurs just 11.2% of the financial outlay of current methods, enhancing its industrial deployability.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Large language model agents receive instructions from many sources-system messages, user prompts, tool outputs, and more-each carrying different levels of trust and authority. When these instructions conflict, models must reliably follow the highest-privilege instruction to remain safe and effective. The dominant paradigm, instruction hierarchy (IH), assumes a fixed, small set of privilege levels (typically fewer than five) defined by rigid role labels (e.g., system > user). This is inadequate for real-world agentic settings, where conflicts can arise across far more sources and contexts. In this work, we propose Many-Tier Instruction Hierarchy (ManyIH), a paradigm for resolving instruction conflicts among instructions with arbitrarily many privilege levels. We introduce ManyIH-Bench, the first benchmark for ManyIH. ManyIH-Bench requires models to navigate up to 12 levels of conflicting instructions with varying privileges, comprising 853 agentic tasks (427 coding and 426 instruction-following). ManyIH-Bench composes constraints developed by LLMs and verified by humans to create realistic and difficult test cases spanning 46 real-world agents. Our experiments show that even the current frontier models perform poorly (~40% accuracy) when instruction conflict scales. This work underscores the urgent need for methods that explicitly target fine-grained, scalable instruction conflict resolution in agentic settings.

Enhancing the instruction-following ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) primarily demands substantial instruction-tuning datasets. However, the sheer volume of these imposes a considerable computational burden and annotation cost. To investigate a label-efficient instruction tuning method that allows the model itself to actively sample subsets that are equally or even more effective, we introduce a self-evolving mechanism DiverseEvol. In this process, a model iteratively augments its training subset to refine its own performance, without requiring any intervention from humans or more advanced LLMs. The key to our data sampling technique lies in the enhancement of diversity in the chosen subsets, as the model selects new data points most distinct from any existing ones according to its current embedding space. Extensive experiments across three datasets and benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of DiverseEvol. Our models, trained on less than 8% of the original dataset, maintain or improve performance compared with finetuning on full data. We also provide empirical evidence to analyze the importance of diversity in instruction data and the iterative scheme as opposed to one-time sampling. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/OFA-Sys/DiverseEvol.git.

GUI grounding, which maps natural-language instructions to actionable UI elements, is a core capability of GUI agents. Prior works largely treats instructions as a static proxy for user intent, overlooking the impact of instruction diversity and quality on grounding performance. Through a careful investigation of existing grounding datasets, we find a 23.3% flaw rate in their instructions and show that inference-time exploitation of instruction diversity yields up to a substantial 76% relative performance improvement. In this paper, we introduce the Instruction-as-Reasoning paradigm, treating instructions as dynamic analytical pathways that offer distinct perspectives and enabling the model to select the most effective pathway during reasoning. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage training framework: supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on synthesized, diverse instructions to instill multi-perspective reasoning, followed by reinforcement learning (RL) to optimize pathway selection and composition. Our resulting models, UI-Ins-7B and UI-Ins-32B, achieve state-of-the-art results on five challenging grounding benchmarks and exhibit emergent reasoning, selectively composing and synthesizing novel instruction pathways at inference. In particular, UI-Ins-32B attains the best grounding accuracy, scoring 87.3% on UI-I2E-Bench, 57.0% on ScreenSpot-Pro, and 84.9% on MMBench-GUI L2. Furthermore, our model demonstrates strong agentic potential, achieving a 74.1% success rate on AndroidWorld using UI-Ins-7B as the executor. Our in-depth analysis reveals additional insights such as how reasoning can be formulated to enhance rather than hinder grounding performance, and how our method mitigates policy collapse in the SFT+RL framework. All code and model checkpoints will be publicly released in https://github.com/alibaba/UI-Ins.

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (e.g., resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (e.g., tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.

The fine-tuning of Large Language Models (LLMs) specialized in code generation has seen notable advancements through the use of open-domain coding queries. Despite the successes, existing methodologies like Evol-Instruct encounter performance limitations, impeding further enhancements in code generation tasks. This paper examines the constraints of existing prompt evolution techniques and introduces a novel approach, Instruction Fusion (IF). IF innovatively combines two distinct prompts through a hybridization process, thereby enhancing the evolution of training prompts for code LLMs. Our experimental results reveal that the proposed novel method effectively addresses the shortcomings of prior methods, significantly improving the performance of Code LLMs across five code generation benchmarks, namely HumanEval, HumanEval+, MBPP, MBPP+ and MultiPL-E, which underscore the effectiveness of Instruction Fusion in advancing the capabilities of LLMs in code generation.

Instruction tuning has emerged as a promising approach to enhancing large language models in following human instructions. It is shown that increasing the diversity and number of instructions in the training data can consistently enhance generalization performance, which facilitates a recent endeavor to collect various instructions and integrate existing instruction tuning datasets into larger collections. However, different users have their unique ways of expressing instructions, and there often exist variations across different datasets in the instruction styles and formats, i.e., format inconsistency. In this work, we study how format inconsistency may impact the performance of instruction tuning. We propose a framework called "Unified Instruction Tuning" (UIT), which calls OpenAI APIs for automatic format transfer among different instruction tuning datasets. We show that UIT successfully improves the generalization performance on unseen instructions, which highlights the importance of format consistency for instruction tuning. To make the UIT framework more practical, we further propose a novel perplexity-based denoising method to reduce the noise of automatic format transfer. We also train a smaller offline model that achieves comparable format transfer capability than OpenAI APIs to reduce costs in practice.

Instruction-tuned large language models (IT-LLMs) exhibit strong zero-shot reasoning, yet their ability to execute simple, self-contained instructions remains underexplored, despite this being foundational to complex instruction-following. We evaluate 20 IT-LLMs on modified MMLU and MMLU-Pro benchmarks, by systematically varying the format of option labels (alphabetic, numeric, Roman) while keeping their meaning identical under four paradigms, namely: (1) With explicit instructions, label changes cause large performance shifts (e.g., -30.45\% for Roman vs. numeric), revealing instruction-format bias. (2) Without instructions, performance drops further (up to -10.84\%) and label sensitivity intensifies, underscoring the role of explicit guidance. (3) When option contents are removed, models fail random-choice baselines except with numeric labels, suggesting weak adherence to atomic directives. (4) Three-shot exemplars yield no significant gains in robustness or fidelity, and generation analyses show persistent label errors, especially for non-numeric formats. Across model sizes, larger LLMs achieve higher accuracy but remain inconsistent in instruction adherence. These results expose the insufficiencies of current instruction-tuning paradigms and highlight the need for evaluation methods and training strategies that explicitly target atomic instruction-following.

Code Large Language Models (Code LLMs) have demonstrated outstanding performance in code-related tasks. Several instruction tuning approaches have been proposed to boost the code generation performance of pre-trained Code LLMs. In this paper, we introduce a diverse instruction model (DolphCoder) with self-evaluating for code generation. It learns diverse instruction targets and combines a code evaluation objective to enhance its code generation ability. Our model achieves superior performance on the HumanEval and MBPP benchmarks, demonstrating new insights for future code instruction tuning work. Our key findings are: (1) Augmenting more diverse responses with distinct reasoning paths increases the code capability of LLMs. (2) Improving one's ability to evaluate the correctness of code solutions also enhances their ability to create it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized various domains but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs manipulate the model into ignoring original instructions and executing designated action. In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanisms of these attacks by analyzing the attention patterns within LLMs. We introduce the concept of the distraction effect, where specific attention heads, termed important heads, shift focus from the original instruction to the injected instruction. Building on this discovery, we propose Attention Tracker, a training-free detection method that tracks attention patterns on instruction to detect prompt injection attacks without the need for additional LLM inference. Our method generalizes effectively across diverse models, datasets, and attack types, showing an AUROC improvement of up to 10.0% over existing methods, and performs well even on small LLMs. We demonstrate the robustness of our approach through extensive evaluations and provide insights into safeguarding LLM-integrated systems from prompt injection vulnerabilities.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Instruction tuning has been attracting much attention to achieve generalization ability across a wide variety of tasks. Although various types of instructions have been manually created for instruction tuning, it is still unclear what kind of instruction is optimal to obtain cross-task generalization ability. This work presents instruction optimization, which optimizes training instructions with respect to generalization ability. Rather than manually tuning instructions, we introduce learnable instructions and optimize them with gradient descent by leveraging bilevel optimization. Experimental results show that the learned instruction enhances the diversity of instructions and improves the generalization ability compared to using only manually created instructions.

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Instruction-based language modeling has received significant attention in pretrained language models. However, the efficiency of instruction engineering remains low and hinders the development of instruction studies. Recent studies have focused on automating instruction generation, but they primarily aim to improve performance without considering other crucial objectives that impact instruction quality, such as instruction length and perplexity. Therefore, we propose a novel approach (i.e., InstOptima) that treats instruction generation as an evolutionary multi-objective optimization problem. In contrast to text edition-based methods, our approach utilizes a large language model (LLM) to simulate instruction operators, including mutation and crossover. Furthermore, we introduce an objective-guided mechanism for these operators, allowing the LLM to comprehend the objectives and enhance the quality of the generated instructions. Experimental results demonstrate improved fine-tuning performance and the generation of a diverse set of high-quality instructions.

Despite widespread deployment of Large Language Models, systematic evaluation of instruction-following capabilities remains challenging. While comprehensive benchmarks exist, focused assessments that quickly diagnose specific instruction adherence patterns are valuable. As newer models may be trained on existing benchmarks, novel evaluation approaches are needed to assess genuine capabilities rather than memorized performance. This paper presents a streamlined evaluation framework using twenty carefully designed prompts to assess LLM instruction-following across diverse task categories. We demonstrate this framework through a large-scale empirical study conducted on October 14, 2025, testing 256 verified working models from 331 available via OpenRouter. To ensure methodological rigor and prevent selection bias, we first verified each model's basic functionality before inclusion. Unlike large-scale benchmarks requiring extensive computational resources, our approach offers a practical diagnostic tool researchers and practitioners can readily apply. Our methodology builds upon verifiable instructions while introducing a compact test suite balancing comprehensiveness with efficiency. Each prompt targets distinct aspects of instruction following, including format compliance, content constraints, logical sequencing, and multi-step task execution. We evaluate models from major providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Mistral) and emerging implementations (Qwen, DeepSeek, community models), providing comparative performance analysis. Our findings reveal consistent failure modes and identify specific instruction types posing particular challenges. This work contributes both a practical evaluation tool and one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of instruction-following capabilities across the contemporary LLM landscape.

Instruction tuning has been widely used to unleash the complete potential of large language models. Notably, complex and diverse instructions are of significant importance as they can effectively align models with various downstream tasks. However, current approaches to constructing large-scale instructions predominantly favour powerful models such as GPT-4 or those with over 70 billion parameters, under the empirical presumption that such larger language models (LLMs) inherently possess enhanced capabilities. In this study, we question this prevalent assumption and conduct an in-depth exploration into the potential of smaller language models (SLMs) in the context of instruction evolution. Extensive experiments across three scenarios of instruction evolution reveal that smaller language models (SLMs) can synthesize more effective instructions than LLMs. Further analysis demonstrates that SLMs possess a broader output space during instruction evolution, resulting in more complex and diverse variants. We also observe that the existing metrics fail to focus on the impact of the instructions. Thus, we propose Instruction Complex-Aware IFD (IC-IFD), which introduces instruction complexity in the original IFD score to evaluate the effectiveness of instruction data more accurately. Our source code is available at: https://github.com/HypherX/Evolution-Analysis{https://github.com/HypherX/Evolution-Analysis}

Finetuning large language models with a variety of instruction-response pairs has enhanced their capability to understand and follow instructions. Current instruction tuning primarily relies on teacher models or human intervention to generate and refine the instructions and responses, which are costly, non-sustainable, and may lack diversity. In this paper, we introduce Mosaic Instruction Tuning (Mosaic-IT), a human/model-free method that can efficiently create rich and diverse augmentations from existing instruction tuning data to enhance the finetuned LLM.Mosaic-IT randomly concatenates multiple instruction data into one and trains the model to produce the corresponding responses with predefined higher-level meta-instructions to strengthen its multi-step instruction-following and format-following skills. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate a superior performance and training efficiency of Mosaic-IT, which achieves consistent performance improvements over various benchmarks and an 80% reduction in training costs compared with original instruction tuning. Our codes and data are available at https://github.com/tianyi-lab/Mosaic-IT.

Instruction finetuning is standard practice for improving LLM performance, yet it remains unclear whether it enhances reasoning or merely induces surface-level pattern matching. We investigate this by evaluating base and instruction-tuned models on standard math benchmarks, structurally perturbed variants, and domain-shifted tasks. Our analysis highlights two key (often overlooked) limitations of instruction tuning. First, the performance advantage is unstable and depends heavily on evaluation settings. In zero-shot CoT settings on GSM8K, base models consistently outperform instruction-tuned variants, with drops as high as 32.67\% (Llama3-70B). Instruction-tuned models only match or exceed this performance when provided with few-shot exemplars, suggesting a reliance on specific prompting patterns rather than intrinsic reasoning. Second, tuning gains are brittle under distribution shift. Our results show that base models surpass instruction-tuned variants on the domain-specific MedCalc benchmark. Additionally, instruction-tuned models show sharp declines on perturbed datasets, indicating sensitivity to prompt structure over robust reasoning.

Instruction following evaluates large language models (LLMs) on their ability to generate outputs that adhere to user-defined constraints. However, existing benchmarks often rely on templated constraint prompts, which lack the diversity of real-world usage and limit fine-grained performance assessment. To fill this gap, we propose a multi-dimensional constraint framework encompassing three constraint patterns, four constraint categories, and four difficulty levels. Building on this framework, we develop an automated instruction generation pipeline that performs constraint expansion, conflict detection, and instruction rewriting, yielding 1,200 code-verifiable instruction-following test samples. We evaluate 19 LLMs across seven model families and uncover substantial variation in performance across constraint forms. For instance, average performance drops from 77.67% at Level I to 32.96% at Level IV. Furthermore, we demonstrate the utility of our approach by using it to generate data for reinforcement learning, achieving substantial gains in instruction following without degrading general performance. In-depth analysis indicates that these gains stem primarily from modifications in the model's attention modules parameters, which enhance constraint recognition and adherence. Code and data are available in https://github.com/Junjie-Ye/MulDimIF.

With the growing demand for applying large language models to downstream tasks, improving model alignment performance and efficiency has become crucial. Such a process involves selecting informative instructions from a candidate pool. However, due to the complexity of instruction set distributions, the key factors driving the performance of aligned models remain unclear. As a result, current instruction set refinement methods fail to improve performance as the instruction pool expands continuously. To address this issue, we first investigate the key factors that influence the relationship between instruction dataset distribution and aligned model performance. Based on these insights, we propose a novel instruction data selection method. We identify that the depth of instructions and the coverage of the semantic space are the crucial factors determining downstream performance, which could explain over 70\% of the model loss on the development set. We then design an instruction selection algorithm to simultaneously maximize the depth and semantic coverage of the selected instructions. Experimental results demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art baseline methods, it can sustainably improve model performance at a faster pace and thus achieve ``Accelerated Scaling''.

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) show impressive results in numerous practical applications, but they lack essential safety features that are common in other areas of computer science, particularly an explicit separation of instructions and data. This makes them vulnerable to manipulations such as indirect prompt injections and generally unsuitable for safety-critical tasks. Surprisingly, there is currently no established definition or benchmark to quantify this phenomenon. In this work, we close this gap by introducing a formal measure for instruction-data separation and an empirical variant that is calculable from a model's outputs. We also present a new dataset, SEP, that allows estimating the measure for real-world models. Our results on various LLMs show that the problem of instruction-data separation is real: all models fail to achieve high separation, and canonical mitigation techniques, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, either fail to substantially improve separation or reduce model utility. The source code and SEP dataset are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/Shold-It-Be-Executed-Or-Processed.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

While recent code-specific large language models (LLMs) have greatly enhanced their code generation capabilities, the safety of these models remains under-explored, posing potential risks as insecure code generated by these models may introduce vulnerabilities into real-world systems. Existing methods collect security-focused datasets from real-world vulnerabilities for instruction tuning in order to mitigate such issues. However, they are largely constrained by the data sparsity of vulnerable code, and have limited applicability in the multi-stage post-training workflows of modern LLMs. In this paper, we propose ProSec, a novel proactive security alignment approach designed to align code LLMs with secure coding practices. ProSec systematically exposes the vulnerabilities in a code LLM by synthesizing vulnerability-inducing coding scenarios from Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) and generates fixes to vulnerable code snippets, allowing the model to learn secure practices through preference learning objectives. The scenarios synthesized by ProSec trigger 25x more vulnerable code than a normal instruction-tuning dataset, resulting in a security-focused alignment dataset 7x larger than the previous work. Experiments show that models trained with ProSec are 25.2% to 35.4% more secure compared to previous work without degrading models' utility.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

In the field of instruction-following large vision-language models (LVLMs), the efficient deployment of these models faces challenges, notably due to the high memory demands of their key-value (KV) caches. Conventional cache management strategies for LLMs focus on cache eviction, which often fails to address the specific needs of multimodal instruction-following models. Recognizing this gap, in this paper, we introduce Elastic Cache, a novel approach that benefits from applying distinct acceleration methods for instruction encoding and output generation stages. We investigate the metrics of importance in different stages and propose an importance-driven cache merging strategy to prune redundancy caches. Instead of discarding less important caches, our strategy identifies important key/value vectors as anchor points. Surrounding less important caches are then merged with these anchors, enhancing the preservation of contextual information in the KV caches while yielding an arbitrary acceleration ratio. For instruction encoding, we utilize the frequency to evaluate the importance of caches. Regarding output generation, we prioritize tokens based on their distance with an offset, by which both the initial and most recent tokens are retained. Results on a range of LVLMs demonstrate that Elastic Cache not only boosts efficiency but also notably outperforms existing pruning methods in language generation across various tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/liuzuyan/ElasticCache

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

From the perspective of content safety issues, alignment has shown to limit large language models' (LLMs) harmful content generation. This intentional method of reinforcing models to not respond to certain user inputs seem to be present in many modern open-source instruction tuning datasets such as OpenAssistant or Guanaco. We introduce a novel insight to an instruction-tuned model's performance affected by the presence of alignment in supervised fine-tuning dataset. To be specific, we noticed that alignment acts as if it is poisoning the instruction dataset. Experimentally, we demonstrate that aligned answers significantly worsen the performance of the resulting fine-tuned model's on various reasoning benchmarks such as Big Bench (BBH), Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU), Human Eval, and Discrete Reasoning Over Paragraphs (DROP), performing worse than the counterpart tuned without alignment by 4-33%.

A popular class of defenses against prompt injection attacks on large language models (LLMs) relies on fine-tuning to separate instructions and data, so that the LLM does not follow instructions that might be present with data. We evaluate the robustness of this approach in the whitebox setting by constructing strong optimization-based attacks, and show that the defenses do not provide the claimed security properties. Specifically, we construct a novel attention-based attack algorithm for textual LLMs and apply it to three recent whitebox defenses SecAlign (CCS 2025), SecAlign++, and StruQ (USENIX Security 2025), showing attacks with success rates of up to 85-95\% on unseen prompts with modest increase in attacker budget in terms of tokens. Our findings make fundamental progress towards understanding the robustness of prompt injection defenses in the whitebox setting. We release our code and attacks at https://github.com/nishitvp/better_opts_attacks

Instruction tuning is crucial for optimizing Large Language Models (LLMs), yet mainstream data selection methods heavily rely on LLMs as instruction quality scorers, leading to high computational costs and reduced data diversity. To address these limitations, we propose MergeIT, a novel LLM-based Merging strategy for better Instruction Tuning that shifts the focus from selection to synthesis. MergeIT operates in two stages: first, topic-aware filtering clusters and refines the dataset, preserving diversity while eliminating redundancy without relying on LLM-based scoring. Second, LLM-based merging synthesizes semantically similar instructions into more informative and compact training data, enhancing data richness while further reducing dataset size. Experimental results demonstrate that MergeIT enables efficient, diverse, and scalable instruction selection and synthesis, establishing LLM-based merging as a promising alternative to conventional scoring-based selection methods for instruction tuning. Our source code and datasets are now available at https://github.com/XcloudFance/MergeIT

We study the design decisions of publicly available instruction tuning methods, and break down the development of Flan 2022 (Chung et al., 2022). Through careful ablation studies on the Flan Collection of tasks and methods, we tease apart the effect of design decisions which enable Flan-T5 to outperform prior work by 3-17%+ across evaluation settings. We find task balancing and enrichment techniques are overlooked but critical to effective instruction tuning, and in particular, training with mixed prompt settings (zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought) actually yields stronger (2%+) performance in all settings. In further experiments, we show Flan-T5 requires less finetuning to converge higher and faster than T5 on single downstream tasks, motivating instruction-tuned models as more computationally-efficient starting checkpoints for new tasks. Finally, to accelerate research on instruction tuning, we make the Flan 2022 collection of datasets, templates, and methods publicly available at https://github.com/google-research/FLAN/tree/main/flan/v2.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Instruction tuning, a specialized technique to enhance large language model (LLM) performance via instruction datasets, relies heavily on the quality of employed data. Existing quality improvement methods alter instruction data through dataset expansion or curation. However, the expansion method risks data redundancy, potentially compromising LLM performance, while the curation approach confines the LLM's potential to the original dataset. Our aim is to surpass the original data quality without encountering these shortcomings. To achieve this, we propose LIFT (LLM Instruction Fusion Transfer), a novel and versatile paradigm designed to elevate the instruction quality to new heights. LIFT strategically broadens data distribution to encompass more high-quality subspaces and eliminates redundancy, concentrating on high-quality segments across overall data subspaces. Experimental results demonstrate that, even with a limited quantity of high-quality instruction data selected by our paradigm, LLMs not only consistently uphold robust performance across various tasks but also surpass some state-of-the-art results, highlighting the significant improvement in instruction quality achieved by our paradigm.

Generating diverse and sophisticated instructions for downstream tasks by Large Language Models (LLMs) is pivotal for advancing the effect. Current approaches leverage closed-source LLMs, employing in-context prompting for instruction generation. However, in this paper, we found that in-context prompting cannot generate complex instructions with length ge 100 for tasks like code completion. To solve this problem, we introduce Ada-Instruct, an adaptive instruction generator developed by fine-tuning open-source LLMs. Our pivotal finding illustrates that fine-tuning open-source LLMs with a mere ten samples generates long instructions that maintain distributional consistency for complex reasoning tasks. We empirically validated Ada-Instruct's efficacy across different applications, including code completion, mathematical reasoning, and commonsense reasoning. The results underscore Ada-Instruct's superiority, evidencing its improvements over its base models, current self-instruct methods, and other state-of-the-art models.

Long-context large language models (LLMs)-for example, Gemini-3.1-Pro and Qwen-3.5-are widely used to empower many real-world applications, such as retrieval-augmented generation, autonomous agents, and AI assistants. However, security remains a major concern for their widespread deployment, with threats such as prompt injection and knowledge corruption. To quantify the security risks faced by LLMs under these threats, the research community has developed heuristic-based and optimization-based red-teaming methods. Optimization-based methods generally produce stronger attacks than heuristic attacks and thus provide a more rigorous assessment of LLM security risks. However, they are often resource-intensive, requiring significant computation and GPU memory, especially for long context scenarios. The resource-intensive nature poses a major obstacle for the community (especially academic researchers) to systematically evaluate the security risks of long-context LLMs and assess the effectiveness of defense strategies at scale. In this work, we propose FlashRT, the first framework to improve the efficiency (in terms of both computation and memory) for optimization-based prompt injection and knowledge corruption attacks under long-context LLMs. Through extensive evaluations, we find that FlashRT consistently delivers a 2x-7x speedup (e.g., reducing runtime from one hour to less than ten minutes) and a 2x-4x reduction in GPU memory consumption (e.g., reducing from 264.1 GB to 65.7 GB GPU memory for a 32K token context) compared to state-of-the-art baseline nanoGCG. FlashRT can be broadly applied to black-box optimization methods, such as TAP and AutoDAN. We hope FlashRT can serve as a red-teaming tool to enable systematic evaluation of long-context LLM security. The code is available at: https://github.com/Wang-Yanting/FlashRT

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Instruction tuning has become a foundation for unlocking the capabilities of large-scale pretrained models and improving their performance on complex tasks. Thus, the construction of high-quality instruction datasets is crucial for enhancing model performance and generalizability. Although current instruction datasets have reached tens of millions of samples, models finetuned on them may still struggle with complex instruction following and tasks in rare domains. This is primarily due to limited expansion in both ``coverage'' (coverage of task types and knowledge areas) and ``depth'' (instruction complexity) of the instruction set. To address this issue, we propose a systematic instruction data construction framework, which integrates a hierarchical labeling system, an informative seed selection algorithm, an evolutionary data synthesis process, and a model deficiency diagnosis with targeted data generation. These components form an iterative closed-loop to continuously enhance the coverage and depth of instruction data. Based on this framework, we construct InfinityInstruct-Subject, a high-quality dataset containing ~1.5 million instructions. Experiments on multiple foundation models and benchmark tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in improving instruction-following capabilities. Further analyses suggest that InfinityInstruct-Subject shows enlarged coverage and depth compared to comparable synthesized instruction datasets. Our work lays a theoretical and practical foundation for the efficient, continuous evolution of instruction datasets, moving from data quantity expansion to qualitative improvement.

Instruction-tuning can be substantially optimized through enhanced diversity, resulting in models capable of handling a broader spectrum of tasks. However, existing data employed for such tuning often exhibit an inadequate coverage of individual domains, limiting the scope for nuanced comprehension and interactions within these areas. To address this deficiency, we propose Explore-Instruct, a novel approach to enhance the data coverage to be used in domain-specific instruction-tuning through active exploration via Large Language Models (LLMs). Built upon representative domain use cases, Explore-Instruct explores a multitude of variations or possibilities by implementing a search algorithm to obtain diversified and domain-focused instruction-tuning data. Our data-centric analysis validates the effectiveness of this proposed approach in improving domain-specific instruction coverage. Moreover, our model's performance demonstrates considerable advancements over multiple baselines, including those utilizing domain-specific data enhancement. Our findings offer a promising opportunity to improve instruction coverage, especially in domain-specific contexts, thereby advancing the development of adaptable language models. Our code, model weights, and data are public at https://github.com/fanqiwan/Explore-Instruct.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant universal capabilities as few/zero-shot learners in various tasks due to their pre-training on vast amounts of text data, as exemplified by GPT-3, which boosted to InstrctGPT and ChatGPT, effectively following natural language instructions to accomplish real-world tasks. In this paper, we propose to introduce instruction tuning into multi-modal models, motivated by the Flamingo model's upstream interleaved format pretraining dataset. We adopt a similar approach to construct our MultI-Modal In-Context Instruction Tuning (MIMIC-IT) dataset. We then introduce Otter, a multi-modal model based on OpenFlamingo (open-sourced version of DeepMind's Flamingo), trained on MIMIC-IT and showcasing improved instruction-following ability and in-context learning. We also optimize OpenFlamingo's implementation for researchers, democratizing the required training resources from 1times A100 GPU to 4times RTX-3090 GPUs, and integrate both OpenFlamingo and Otter into Huggingface Transformers for more researchers to incorporate the models into their customized training and inference pipelines.

Following natural instructions is crucial for the effective application of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. Despite recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), research on assessing and improving instruction-following (IF) alignment within the RAG domain remains limited. To address this issue, we propose VIF-RAG, the first automated, scalable, and verifiable synthetic pipeline for instruction-following alignment in RAG systems. We start by manually crafting a minimal set of atomic instructions (<100) and developing combination rules to synthesize and verify complex instructions for a seed set. We then use supervised models for instruction rewriting while simultaneously generating code to automate the verification of instruction quality via a Python executor. Finally, we integrate these instructions with extensive RAG and general data samples, scaling up to a high-quality VIF-RAG-QA dataset (>100k) through automated processes. To further bridge the gap in instruction-following auto-evaluation for RAG systems, we introduce FollowRAG Benchmark, which includes approximately 3K test samples, covering 22 categories of general instruction constraints and four knowledge-intensive QA datasets. Due to its robust pipeline design, FollowRAG can seamlessly integrate with different RAG benchmarks. Using FollowRAG and eight widely-used IF and foundational abilities benchmarks for LLMs, we demonstrate that VIF-RAG markedly enhances LLM performance across a broad range of general instruction constraints while effectively leveraging its capabilities in RAG scenarios. Further analysis offers practical insights for achieving IF alignment in RAG systems. Our code and datasets are released at https://FollowRAG.github.io.

Using responses generated by high-performing large language models (LLMs) for instruction tuning has become a widely adopted approach. However, the existing literature overlooks a property of LLM-generated responses: they conflate world knowledge acquired during pre-training with instruction-following capabilities acquired during post-training. We hypothesize that disentangling the instruction-following capabilities from pre-trained knowledge improves the effectiveness of instruction tuning. To this end, we propose CoDIT, a method that applies contrastive decoding between a post-trained model and its pre-trained counterpart during response generation. The method suppresses pre-trained knowledge shared between the two models while amplifying the instruction-following behavior acquired via post-training, resulting in responses that more purely reflect instruction-following capabilities. Experiment results demonstrate that models trained on datasets constructed via CoDIT consistently outperform those trained on directly generated responses. Training on our datasets also yields better performance than on existing publicly available instruction-tuning datasets across multiple benchmarks. Furthermore, we theoretically and empirically show that CoDIT can be interpreted as distilling the chat vector from parameter space to text space, enabling the transfer of instruction-tuning capabilities across models of different architectures.

Intermediate Representations (IRs) play a critical role in compiler design and program analysis, yet their comprehension by Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. In this paper, we present an explorative empirical study evaluating the capabilities of six state-of-the-art LLMs: GPT-4, GPT-3, DeepSeek, Gemma 2, Llama 3, and Code Llama, in understanding IRs. Specifically, we assess model performance across four core tasks: control flow graph reconstruction, decompilation, code summarization, and execution reasoning. While LLMs exhibit competence in parsing IR syntax and identifying high-level structures, they consistently struggle with instruction-level reasoning, especially in control flow reasoning, loop handling, and dynamic execution. Common failure modes include misinterpreting branching instructions, omitting critical operations, and relying on heuristic reasoning rather than precise instruction-level logic. Our findings highlight the need for IR-specific enhancements in LLM design. We recommend fine-tuning on structured IR datasets and integrating control-flow-sensitive architectures to improve model effectiveness. All experimental data and source code are publicly available at

Recently, diffusion-based methods, like InstructPix2Pix (IP2P), have achieved effective instruction-based image editing, requiring only natural language instructions from the user. However, these methods often inadvertently alter unintended areas and struggle with multi-instruction editing, resulting in compromised outcomes. To address these issues, we introduce the Focus on Your Instruction (FoI), a method designed to ensure precise and harmonious editing across multiple instructions without extra training or test-time optimization. In the FoI, we primarily emphasize two aspects: (1) precisely extracting regions of interest for each instruction and (2) guiding the denoising process to concentrate within these regions of interest. For the first objective, we identify the implicit grounding capability of IP2P from the cross-attention between instruction and image, then develop an effective mask extraction method. For the second objective, we introduce a cross attention modulation module for rough isolation of target editing regions and unrelated regions. Additionally, we introduce a mask-guided disentangle sampling strategy to further ensure clear region isolation. Experimental results demonstrate that FoI surpasses existing methods in both quantitative and qualitative evaluations, especially excelling in multi-instruction editing task.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

LLM agents are evolving from conversational chatbots to operational tools in real-world workspaces. In local agentic harnesses, an LLM can read and write files, call tools, and reuse workspace state across sessions. While such capabilities enhance utility, they also expose a new attack surface for attackers. Attackers can embed a prompt injection within a file or tool output. Agents may read this hidden instruction, store it, and execute it later. In this multi-step trojan attack paradigm, no individual step appears malicious on its own, but these steps can collectively turn untrusted text into persistent control content. However, existing defenses often inspect each step in isolation. As a result, they can block a clear harmful action, but fail to detect the earlier write operation that plants the backdoor. To reveal this threat, we introduce ClawTrojan, a benchmark designed to identify multi-step trojan attacks in local agentic harnesses. In an OpenClaw-style simulated workspace with GPT-5.4, ClawTrojan reaches a 95.5% attack success rate (ASR), while existing single-turn prompt-injection attacks produce near-zero ASR on the same model. To address this threat, we propose DASGuard, which scans control-like text in sensitive local files, traces its origin, and removes control content that does not originate from a trusted source. Our results show that DASGuard achieves strong dynamic defense by combining runtime attack blocking with sanitized commits to the workspace.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

We present Code Comparison Tuning (CCT), a simple and effective tuning method for code large language models (Code LLMs) to better handle subtle code errors. Specifically, we integrate the concept of comparison into instruction tuning, both at the token and sequence levels, enabling the model to discern even the slightest deviations in code. To compare the original code with an erroneous version containing manually added code errors, we use token-level preference loss for detailed token-level comparisons. Additionally, we combine code segments to create a new instruction tuning sample for sequence-level comparisons, enhancing the model's bug-fixing capability. Experimental results on the HumanEvalFix benchmark show that CCT surpasses instruction tuning in pass@1 scores by up to 4 points across diverse code LLMs, and extensive analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of our method.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle to follow a sequence of instructions in a single query as they may ignore or misinterpret part of it. This impairs their performance in complex problems whose solution requires multiple intermediate steps, such as multilingual (translate then answer) and multimodal (caption then answer) tasks. We empirically verify this with open-source LLMs as large as LLaMA-2 70B and Mixtral-8x7B. Targeting the scarcity of sequential instructions in present-day data, we propose sequential instruction tuning, a simple yet effective strategy to automatically augment instruction tuning data and equip LLMs with the ability to execute multiple sequential instructions. After exploring interleaving instructions in existing datasets, such as Alpaca, with a wide range of intermediate tasks, we find that sequential instruction-tuned models consistently outperform the conventional instruction-tuned baselines in downstream tasks involving reasoning, multilingual, and multimodal abilities. To shed further light on our technique, we analyse how adversarial intermediate texts, unseen tasks, prompt verbalization, number of tasks, and prompt length affect SIT. We hope that this method will open new research avenues on instruction tuning for complex tasks.

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

As the complexities of processors keep increasing, the task of effectively verifying their integrity and security becomes ever more daunting. The intricate web of instructions, microarchitectural features, and interdependencies woven into modern processors pose a formidable challenge for even the most diligent verification and security engineers. To tackle this growing concern, recently, researchers have developed fuzzing techniques explicitly tailored for hardware processors. However, a prevailing issue with these hardware fuzzers is their heavy reliance on static strategies to make decisions in their algorithms. To address this problem, we develop a novel dynamic and adaptive decision-making framework, MABFuzz, that uses multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms to fuzz processors. MABFuzz is agnostic to, and hence, applicable to, any existing hardware fuzzer. In the process of designing MABFuzz, we encounter challenges related to the compatibility of MAB algorithms with fuzzers and maximizing their efficacy for fuzzing. We overcome these challenges by modifying the fuzzing process and tailoring MAB algorithms to accommodate special requirements for hardware fuzzing. We integrate three widely used MAB algorithms in a state-of-the-art hardware fuzzer and evaluate them on three popular RISC-V-based processors. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of MABFuzz to cover a broader spectrum of processors' intricate landscapes and doing so with remarkable efficiency. In particular, MABFuzz achieves up to 308x speedup in detecting vulnerabilities and up to 5x speedup in achieving coverage compared to a state-of-the-art technique.

Existing research has demonstrated that refining large language models (LLMs) through the utilization of machine-generated instruction-following data empowers these models to exhibit impressive zero-shot capabilities for novel tasks, without requiring human-authored instructions. In this paper, we systematically investigate, preprocess, and integrate three Chinese instruction-following datasets with the aim of enhancing the Chinese conversational capabilities of Mixtral-8x7B sparse Mixture-of-Experts model. Through instruction fine-tuning on this carefully processed dataset, we successfully construct the Mixtral-8x7B sparse Mixture-of-Experts model named "Aurora." To assess the performance of Aurora, we utilize three widely recognized benchmark tests: C-Eval, MMLU, and CMMLU. Empirical studies validate the effectiveness of instruction fine-tuning applied to Mixtral-8x7B sparse Mixture-of-Experts model. This work is pioneering in the execution of instruction fine-tuning on a sparse expert-mixed model, marking a significant breakthrough in enhancing the capabilities of this model architecture. Our code, data and model are publicly available at https://github.com/WangRongsheng/Aurora

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Instruction tuning has emerged as the key in aligning large language models (LLMs) with specific task instructions, thereby mitigating the discrepancy between the next-token prediction objective and users' actual goals. To reduce the labor and time cost to collect or annotate data by humans, researchers start to explore the use of LLMs to generate instruction-aligned synthetic data. Recent works focus on generating diverse instructions and applying LLM to increase instruction complexity, often neglecting downstream use cases. It remains unclear how to tailor high-quality data to elicit better instruction-following abilities in different target instruction distributions and LLMs. To this end, we introduce CodecLM, a general framework for adaptively generating high-quality synthetic data for LLM alignment with different downstream instruction distributions and LLMs. Drawing on the Encode-Decode principles, we use LLMs as codecs to guide the data generation process. We first encode seed instructions into metadata, which are concise keywords generated on-the-fly to capture the target instruction distribution, and then decode metadata to create tailored instructions. We also introduce Self-Rubrics and Contrastive Filtering during decoding to tailor data-efficient samples. Extensive experiments on four open-domain instruction following benchmarks validate the effectiveness of CodecLM over the current state-of-the-arts.

Information-based data selection for instruction tuning is compelling: maximizing the log-determinant of the Fisher information yields a monotone submodular objective, enabling greedy algorithms to achieve a (1-1/e) approximation under a cardinality budget. In practice, however, we identify alleviating gradient conflicts, misalignment between per-sample gradients, is a key factor that slows down the decay of marginal log-determinant information gains, thereby preventing significant loss of information. We formalize this via an varepsilon-decomposition that quantifies the deviation from ideal submodularity as a function of conflict statistics, yielding data-dependent approximation factors that tighten as conflicts diminish. Guided by this analysis, we propose SPICE, a conflict-aware selector that maximizes information while penalizing misalignment, and that supports early stopping and proxy models for efficiency. Empirically, SPICE selects subsets with higher log-determinant information than original criteria, and these informational gains translate into performance improvements: across 8 benchmarks with LLaMA2-7B and Qwen2-7B, SPICE uses only 10% of the data, yet matches or exceeds 6 methods including full-data tuning. This achieves performance improvements with substantially lower training cost.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

KV cache compression promises increased throughput and efficiency with negligible loss in performance. While the gains in throughput are indisputable and recent literature has indeed shown minimal degradation on particular benchmarks, in general the consequences of compression in realistic scenarios such as multi-instruction prompting have been insufficiently studied. In this paper, we identify several pitfalls practitioners should be aware of when deploying KV cache compressed LLMs. Importantly, we show that certain instructions degrade much more rapidly with compression, effectively causing them to be completely ignored by the LLM. As a practical example of that, we highlight system prompt leakage as a case study, empirically showing the impact of compression on leakage and general instruction following. We show several factors that play a role in prompt leakage: compression method, instruction order, and KV eviction bias. We then propose simple changes to KV cache eviction policies that can reduce the impact of these factors and improve the overall performance in multi-instruction tasks.

Instruction tuning is crucial for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the quality of instruction-following data varies significantly. While high-quality data is paramount, it is often scarce; conversely, abundant low-quality data is frequently discarded, leading to substantial information loss. Existing data augmentation methods struggle to augment this low-quality data effectively, and the evaluation of such techniques remains poorly defined. To address this, we formally define the task of Instruction Distillation: distilling multiple low-quality and redundant inputs into high-quality and coherent instruction-output pairs. Specifically, we introduce a comprehensive data construction pipeline to create MIXTURE, a 144K-sample dataset pairing low-quality or semantically redundant imperfect instruction clusters with their high-quality distillations. We then introduce LM-Mixup, by first performing supervised fine-tuning on MIXTURE and then optimizing it with reinforcement learning. This process uses three complementary reward signals: quality, semantic alignment, and format compliance, via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We demonstrate that LM-Mixup effectively augments imperfect datasets: fine-tuning LLMs on its distilled data, which accounts for only about 3% of the entire dataset, not only surpasses full-dataset training but also competes with state-of-the-art high-quality data selection methods across multiple benchmarks. Our work establishes that low-quality data is a valuable resource when properly distilled and augmented with LM-Mixup, significantly enhancing the efficiency and performance of instruction-tuned LLMs.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Instruction tuning relies on large instruction-response corpora whose quality and composition strongly affect downstream performance. We propose Answer Divergence-Guided Selection (ADG), which selects instruction data based on the geometric structure of multi-sample outputs. ADG draws several high-temperature generations per instruction, maps responses into an embedding space, and computes an output divergence score that jointly encodes dispersion magnitude and shape anisotropy. High scores correspond to instructions whose answers are both far apart and multi-modal, rather than clustered paraphrases along a single direction. Across two backbones and three public instruction pools, fine-tuning on only 10K ADG-selected examples consistently outperforms strong selectors on six benchmarks spanning reasoning, knowledge, and coding. Analyses further show that both dispersion magnitude and shape anisotropy are necessary, supporting answer divergence as a practical signal for instruction data selection. Code and appendix are included in the supplementary materials.

Instruction-following has emerged as a crucial capability for large language models (LLMs). However, existing approaches often rely on pre-existing documents or external resources to synthesize instruction-following data, which limits their flexibility and generalizability. In this paper, we introduce DecIF, a fully autonomous, meta-decomposition guided framework that generates diverse and high-quality instruction-following data using only LLMs. DecIF is grounded in the principle of decomposition. For instruction generation, we guide LLMs to iteratively produce various types of meta-information, which are then combined with response constraints to form well-structured and semantically rich instructions. We further utilize LLMs to detect and resolve potential inconsistencies within the generated instructions. Regarding response generation, we decompose each instruction into atomic-level evaluation criteria, enabling rigorous validation and the elimination of inaccurate instruction-response pairs. Extensive experiments across a wide range of scenarios and settings demonstrate DecIF's superior performance on instruction-following tasks. Further analysis highlights its strong flexibility, scalability, and generalizability in automatically synthesizing high-quality instruction data.

Instruction tuning is widely used to improve a pre-trained Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) by training it on curated task-specific datasets, enabling better comprehension of human instructions. However, it is infeasible to collect all possible instruction datasets simultaneously in real-world scenarios. Thus, enabling MLLM with continual instruction tuning is essential for maintaining their adaptability. However, existing methods often trade off memory efficiency for performance gains, significantly compromising overall efficiency. In this paper, we propose a task-specific expansion and task-general fusion framework based on the variations in Centered Kernel Alignment (CKA) similarity across different model layers when trained on diverse datasets. Furthermore, we analyze the information leakage present in the existing benchmark and propose a new and more challenging benchmark to rationally evaluate the performance of different methods. Comprehensive experiments showcase a significant performance improvement of our method compared to existing state-of-the-art methods. Our code will be public available.

Open large language models (LLMs) with great performance in various tasks have significantly advanced the development of LLMs. However, they are far inferior to commercial models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4 when acting as agents to tackle complex tasks in the real world. These agent tasks employ LLMs as the central controller responsible for planning, memorization, and tool utilization, necessitating both fine-grained prompting methods and robust LLMs to achieve satisfactory performance. Though many prompting methods have been proposed to complete particular agent tasks, there is lack of research focusing on improving the agent capabilities of LLMs themselves without compromising their general abilities. In this work, we present AgentTuning, a simple and general method to enhance the agent abilities of LLMs while maintaining their general LLM capabilities. We construct AgentInstruct, a lightweight instruction-tuning dataset containing high-quality interaction trajectories. We employ a hybrid instruction-tuning strategy by combining AgentInstruct with open-source instructions from general domains. AgentTuning is used to instruction-tune the Llama 2 series, resulting in AgentLM. Our evaluations show that AgentTuning enables LLMs' agent capabilities without compromising general abilities. The AgentLM-70B is comparable to GPT-3.5-turbo on unseen agent tasks, demonstrating generalized agent capabilities. We open source the AgentInstruct and AgentLM-7B, 13B, and 70B models at https://github.com/THUDM/AgentTuning , serving open and powerful alternatives to commercial LLMs for agent tasks.

The hardware ecosystem is rapidly evolving, with increasing interest in translating low-level programs across different instruction set architectures (ISAs) in a quick, flexible, and correct way to enhance the portability and longevity of existing code. A particularly challenging class of this transpilation problem is translating between complex- (CISC) and reduced- (RISC) hardware architectures, due to fundamental differences in instruction complexity, memory models, and execution paradigms. In this work, we introduce GG (Guaranteed Guess), an ISA-centric transpilation pipeline that combines the translation power of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) with the rigor of established software testing constructs. Our method generates candidate translations using an LLM from one ISA to another, and embeds such translations within a software-testing framework to build quantifiable confidence in the translation. We evaluate our GG approach over two diverse datasets, enforce high code coverage (>98%) across unit tests, and achieve functional/semantic correctness of 99% on HumanEval programs and 49% on BringupBench programs, respectively. Further, we compare our approach to the state-of-the-art Rosetta 2 framework on Apple Silicon, showcasing 1.73x faster runtime performance, 1.47x better energy efficiency, and 2.41x better memory usage for our transpiled code, demonstrating the effectiveness of GG for real-world CISC-to-RISC translation tasks. We will open-source our codes, data, models, and benchmarks to establish a common foundation for ISA-level code translation research.

In the current landscape of large language models (LLMs), the process of instruction tuning serves as an essential step. Considering the high computing power overhead, data-efficient instruction tuning was proposed to reduce the training data size in this process, aiming at selecting high-quality instructional data. Nevertheless, we argue that most current data-efficient instruction-tuning methods are highly dependent on the quality of the original instruction-tuning dataset. When it comes to datasets synthesized by LLMs, a common scenario in this field, dirty samples will even be selected with a higher probability than other samples. To address these challenges, we utilized external knowledge (relevant examples or paragraphs) to evaluate those samples synthesized by LLMs with an in-context-based relative predictive entropy. Based on the new metric, we proposed a framework, dubbed as RECOST, which integrates external-knowledge-base re-ranking and diversity-consistent sampling into a single pipeline. Through extensive experiments on several synthetic datasets (Alpaca and Alpaca-gpt4), we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and achieve even better results with only 1\% of the full dataset.

Modern language models (LMs) have gained widespread acceptance in everyday and professional contexts, particularly in programming. An essential procedure enabling this adoption is instruction tuning, which substantially enhances LMs' practical utility by training them to follow user instructions and human preferences. However, existing instruction tuning schemes overlook a crucial aspect: the security of generated code. As a result, even the state-of-the-art instruction-tuned LMs frequently produce unsafe code, posing significant security risks. In this work, we introduce SafeCoder to address this gap. SafeCoder performs security-centric fine-tuning using a diverse and high-quality dataset that we collected using an automated pipeline. We integrate the security fine-tuning with standard instruction tuning, to facilitate a joint optimization of both security and utility. Despite its simplicity, we show that SafeCoder is effective across a variety of popular LMs and datasets. It is able to drastically improve security (by about 30%), while preserving utility.

Deployed LLM agents rely on agentic context, the model-external textual control content assembled by an operational harness. In this work, the mutable component of that context is a persistent system-level instruction that is updated from operational experience while the model, tools, and harness remain fixed. Over long evolution horizons, flat-text maintenance makes verification increasingly difficult as accumulated instructions grow and interact. We propose Graph-Regularized Agentic Context Evolution (GRACE), which maintains the persistent instruction component as a typed semantic graph and validates proposed updates within the local typed neighborhoods of modified nodes. Accepted graph updates are reconstructed as incremental edits to the textual instruction checkpoint used at deployment. We evaluate GRACE within a fixed telecom agent harness derived from τ^2-bench under a controlled distribution-shift protocol. Across five independent replications, GRACE improves strict reliability, measured by pass^3, from the Gemini 2.5 Flash zero-shot value of 0.091 to 0.673pm0.136 at the final checkpoint. This exceeds a Gemini 3.1 Pro zero-shot reference of 0.242 on the same held-out set, while the flat-text HCE baseline finishes at 0.191pm0.051. These results identify two requirements for reliable long-horizon context evolution, a structural substrate that makes verification local and a consolidation mechanism that keeps accumulated instruction content usable.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Recent advances in instruction-based image editing have shown remarkable progress. However, existing methods remain limited to relatively simple editing operations, hindering real-world applications that require complex and compositional instructions. In this work, we address these limitations from the perspectives of architectural design, data, and evaluation protocols. Specifically, we identify two key challenges in current models: insufficient instruction compliance and background inconsistency. To this end, we propose MCIE-E1, a Multimodal Large Language Model-Driven Complex Instruction Image Editing method that integrates two key modules: a spatial-aware cross-attention module and a background-consistent cross-attention module. The former enhances instruction-following capability by explicitly aligning semantic instructions with spatial regions through spatial guidance during the denoising process, while the latter preserves features in unedited regions to maintain background consistency. To enable effective training, we construct a dedicated data pipeline to mitigate the scarcity of complex instruction-based image editing datasets, combining fine-grained automatic filtering via a powerful MLLM with rigorous human validation. Finally, to comprehensively evaluate complex instruction-based image editing, we introduce CIE-Bench, a new benchmark with two new evaluation metrics. Experimental results on CIE-Bench demonstrate that MCIE-E1 consistently outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods in both quantitative and qualitative assessments, achieving a 23.96% improvement in instruction compliance.

A practical approach to activate long chain-of-thoughts reasoning ability in pre-trained large language models is to perform supervised fine-tuning on instruction datasets synthesized by strong Large Reasoning Models such as DeepSeek-R1, offering a cost-effective alternative to reinforcement learning. However, large-scale instruction sets with more than 100k samples incur significant training overhead, while effective strategies for automatic long-CoT instruction selection still remain unexplored. In this work, we propose Select2Reason, a novel and efficient instruction-tuning data selection framework for long-CoT reasoning. From the perspective of emergence of rethinking behaviors like self-correction and backtracking, we investigate common metrics that may determine the quality of long-CoT reasoning instructions. Select2Reason leverages a quantifier to estimate difficulty of question and jointly incorporates a reasoning trace length-based heuristic through a weighted scheme for ranking to prioritize high-utility examples. Empirical results on OpenR1-Math-220k demonstrate that fine-tuning LLM on only 10% of the data selected by Select2Reason achieves performance competitive with or superior to full-data tuning and open-source baseline OpenR1-Qwen-7B across three competition-level and six comprehensive mathematical benchmarks. Further experiments highlight the scalability in varying data size, efficiency during inference, and its adaptability to other instruction pools with minimal cost.

Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings. We present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of automated prompt injection attacks against LLM agents, adapting both white-box (GCG) and black-box (TAP) methods to the agentic setting within the AgentDojo framework. We evaluate across 80 task pairs spanning four domains and multiple models, and find that black-box optimization substantially outperforms gradient-based methods, a gap we attribute to GCG's optimization instability under reasonable compute budgets. We also find that TAP's effectiveness depends on the attacker model, as both general capability and safety tuning affect attack success--stronger models produce more effective injections, while safety-tuned attackers can refuse to generate adversarial prompts. Task-universal attacks transfer effectively to unseen tasks and out-of-distribution domains, but attacks optimized on smaller open-source models do not transfer to frontier models like GPT-5. These findings highlight automated prompt injection as a credible but model-dependent threat, with significant barriers remaining for model-agnostic exploitation.

Instruction tuning has been used as a promising approach to improve the performance of large language models (LLMs) on unseen tasks. However, current LLMs exhibit limited robustness to unseen instructions, generating inconsistent outputs when the same instruction is phrased with slightly varied forms or language styles. This behavior indicates LLMs' lack of robustness to textual variations and generalizability to unseen instructions, potentially leading to trustworthiness issues. Accordingly, we propose Contrastive Instruction Tuning, which maximizes the similarity between the hidden representations of semantically equivalent instruction-instance pairs while minimizing the similarity between semantically different ones. To facilitate this approach, we augment the existing FLAN collection by paraphrasing task instructions. Experiments on the PromptBench benchmark show that CoIN consistently improves LLMs' robustness to unseen instructions with variations across character, word, sentence, and semantic levels by an average of +2.5% in accuracy.

Instruction Tuning involves finetuning a language model on a collection of instruction-formatted datasets in order to enhance the generalizability of the model to unseen tasks. Studies have shown the importance of balancing different task proportions during finetuning, but finding the right balance remains challenging. Unfortunately, there's currently no systematic method beyond manual tuning or relying on practitioners' intuition. In this paper, we introduce SMART (Submodular data Mixture strAtegy for instRuction Tuning) - a novel data mixture strategy which makes use of a submodular function to assign importance scores to tasks which are then used to determine the mixture weights. Given a fine-tuning budget, SMART redistributes the budget among tasks and selects non-redundant samples from each task. Experimental results demonstrate that SMART significantly outperforms traditional methods such as examples proportional mixing and equal mixing. Furthermore, SMART facilitates the creation of data mixtures based on a few representative subsets of tasks alone and through task pruning analysis, we reveal that in a limited budget setting, allocating budget among a subset of representative tasks yields superior performance compared to distributing the budget among all tasks. The code for reproducing our results is open-sourced at https://github.com/kowndinya-renduchintala/SMART.

Multi-modal large language model (MLLM)-based web agents interact with webpage environments by generating actions based on screenshots of the webpages. In this work, we propose WebInject, a prompt injection attack that manipulates the webpage environment to induce a web agent to perform an attacker-specified action. Our attack adds a perturbation to the raw pixel values of the rendered webpage. After these perturbed pixels are mapped into a screenshot, the perturbation induces the web agent to perform the attacker-specified action. We formulate the task of finding the perturbation as an optimization problem. A key challenge in solving this problem is that the mapping between raw pixel values and screenshot is non-differentiable, making it difficult to backpropagate gradients to the perturbation. To overcome this, we train a neural network to approximate the mapping and apply projected gradient descent to solve the reformulated optimization problem. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets shows that WebInject is highly effective and significantly outperforms baselines.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has advanced the reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs), enabling autonomous agents that can conduct effective multi-turn and tool-integrated reasoning. While instructions serve as the primary protocol for defining agents, RLVR typically relies on static and manually designed instructions. However, those instructions may be suboptimal for the base model, and the optimal instruction may change as the agent's policy improves and explores the interaction with the environment. To bridge the gap, we introduce INSPO, a novel Instruction-Policy co-evolution framework that integrates instruction optimization as a dynamic component of the reinforcement learning (RL) loop. INSPO maintains a dynamic population of instruction candidates that are sampled with questions, where reward signals in RL loops are automatically attributed to each instruction, and low performers are periodically pruned. New instructions are generated and verified through an on-policy reflection mechanism, where an LLM-based optimizer analyzes past experience from a replay buffer and evolves more effective strategies given the current policy. We conduct extensive experiments on multi-turn retrieval and reasoning tasks, demonstrating that INSPO substantially outperforms strong baselines relying on static instructions. INSPO discovers innovative instructions that guide the agent toward more strategic reasoning paths, achieving substantial performance gains with only a marginal increase in computational overhead.

Continual instruction tuning updates a language model through a sequence of new domains, yet each update can progressively erode previously learned capabilities and alignment behavior. Replay is the standard mitigation, but fixed replay ratios are inherently limited because the optimal mixture varies with the current domain, the training stage, and the evolving vulnerability of prior behaviors. We propose PROX-YMIX, a framework that learns a dynamic replay controller on a small proxy model and transfers the frozen controller to a larger target. The controller never observes future tasks and constructs its state from normalized validation losses and their temporal dynamics, producing a masked mixture over the current task and accessible replay buffers. Our core empirical hypothesis is forgetting mirroring: task vulnerability rankings remain largely consistent across model scales even when absolute loss magnitudes differ. We validate this assumption empirically before transferring controllers across scales. On LLaMA-3-8B across five continual instruction tuning sequences, PROXYMIX improves average accuracy by 3.4 points, reduces final forgetting by 3.5 points, and raises safety score by 5.8 points over the strongest non-oracle baseline, at roughly 50x lower policy learning cost than Oracle Target RL. The framework is leakage free and architecture independent at the interface level, and we also identify settings where the proxy assumption breaks down, highlighting limitations for robust deployment.

Instruction fine-tuning has recently emerged as a promising approach for improving the zero-shot capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) on new tasks. This technique has shown particular strength in improving the performance of modestly sized LLMs, sometimes inducing performance competitive with much larger model variants. In this paper we ask two questions: (1) How sensitive are instruction-tuned models to the particular phrasings of instructions, and, (2) How can we make them more robust to such natural language variation? To answer the former, we collect a set of 319 instructions manually written by NLP practitioners for over 80 unique tasks included in widely used benchmarks, and we evaluate the variance and average performance of these instructions as compared to instruction phrasings observed during instruction fine-tuning. We find that using novel (unobserved) but appropriate instruction phrasings consistently degrades model performance, sometimes substantially so. Further, such natural instructions yield a wide variance in downstream performance, despite their semantic equivalence. Put another way, instruction-tuned models are not especially robust to instruction re-phrasings. We propose a simple method to mitigate this issue by introducing ``soft prompt'' embedding parameters and optimizing these to maximize the similarity between representations of semantically equivalent instructions. We show that this method consistently improves the robustness of instruction-tuned models.

While real-world applications increasingly demand intricate scene manipulation, existing instruction-guided image editing benchmarks often oversimplify task complexity and lack comprehensive, fine-grained instructions. To bridge this gap, we introduce, a large-scale benchmark specifically designed for complex instruction-guided image editing. CompBench features challenging editing scenarios that incorporate fine-grained instruction following, spatial and contextual reasoning, thereby enabling comprehensive evaluation of image editing models' precise manipulation capabilities. To construct CompBench, We propose an MLLM-human collaborative framework with tailored task pipelines. Furthermore, we propose an instruction decoupling strategy that disentangles editing intents into four key dimensions: location, appearance, dynamics, and objects, ensuring closer alignment between instructions and complex editing requirements. Extensive evaluations reveal that CompBench exposes fundamental limitations of current image editing models and provides critical insights for the development of next-generation instruction-guided image editing systems. The dataset, code, and models are available in https://comp-bench.github.io/.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.

In the realm of Large Language Models, the balance between instruction data quality and quantity has become a focal point. Recognizing this, we introduce a self-guided methodology for LLMs to autonomously discern and select cherry samples from vast open-source datasets, effectively minimizing manual curation and potential cost for instruction tuning an LLM. Our key innovation, the Instruction-Following Difficulty (IFD) metric, emerges as a pivotal tool to identify discrepancies between a model's expected responses and its autonomous generation prowess. Through the adept application of IFD, cherry samples are pinpointed, leading to a marked uptick in model training efficiency. Empirical validations on renowned datasets like Alpaca and WizardLM underpin our findings; with a mere 10% of conventional data input, our strategy showcases improved results. This synthesis of self-guided cherry-picking and the IFD metric signifies a transformative leap in the optimization of LLMs, promising both efficiency and resource-conscious advancements. Codes, data, and models are available: https://github.com/MingLiiii/Cherry_LLM

With the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs), prompt injection attacks have emerged as a significant security threat. Existing defense mechanisms often face critical trade-offs between effectiveness and generalizability. This highlights the urgent need for efficient prompt injection detection methods that are applicable across a wide range of LLMs. To address this challenge, we propose DMPI-PMHFE, a dual-channel feature fusion detection framework. It integrates a pretrained language model with heuristic feature engineering to detect prompt injection attacks. Specifically, the framework employs DeBERTa-v3-base as a feature extractor to transform input text into semantic vectors enriched with contextual information. In parallel, we design heuristic rules based on known attack patterns to extract explicit structural features commonly observed in attacks. Features from both channels are subsequently fused and passed through a fully connected neural network to produce the final prediction. This dual-channel approach mitigates the limitations of relying only on DeBERTa to extract features. Experimental results on diverse benchmark datasets demonstrate that DMPI-PMHFE outperforms existing methods in terms of accuracy, recall, and F1-score. Furthermore, when deployed actually, it significantly reduces attack success rates across mainstream LLMs, including GLM-4, LLaMA 3, Qwen 2.5, and GPT-4o.

Large language models~(LLMs) obtain instruction-following capability through instruction-finetuning (IFT) on supervised instruction/response data. However, widely used IFT datasets (e.g., Alpaca's 52k data) surprisingly contain many low-quality instances with incorrect or irrelevant responses, which are misleading and detrimental to IFT. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective data selection strategy that automatically identifies and removes low-quality data using a strong LLM (e.g., ChatGPT). To this end, we introduce AlpaGasus, which is finetuned on only 9k high-quality data filtered from the 52k Alpaca data. AlpaGasus significantly outperforms the original Alpaca as evaluated by GPT-4 on multiple test sets and its 13B variant matches >90% performance of its teacher LLM (i.e., Text-Davinci-003) on test tasks. It also provides 5.7x faster training, reducing the training time for a 7B variant from 80 minutes (for Alpaca) to 14 minutes We apply IFT for the same number of epochs as Alpaca(7B) but on fewer data, using 4timesNVIDIA A100 (80GB) GPUs and following the original Alpaca setting and hyperparameters.. Overall, AlpaGasus demonstrates a novel data-centric IFT paradigm that can be generally applied to instruction-tuning data, leading to faster training and better instruction-following models. Our project page is available at: https://lichang-chen.github.io/AlpaGasus/.

Instruction fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) often involves selecting a subset of instruction training data from a large candidate pool, using a small query set from the target task. Despite growing interest, the literature on targeted instruction selection remains fragmented and opaque: methods vary widely in selection budgets, often omit zero-shot baselines, and frequently entangle the contributions of key components. As a result, practitioners lack actionable guidance on selecting instructions for their target tasks. In this work, we aim to bring clarity to this landscape by disentangling and systematically analyzing the two core ingredients: data representation and selection algorithms. Our framework enables controlled comparisons across models, tasks, and budgets. We find that only gradient-based data representations choose subsets whose similarity to the query consistently predicts performance across datasets and models. While no single method dominates, gradient-based representations paired with a greedy round-robin selection algorithm tend to perform best on average at low budgets, but these benefits diminish at larger budgets. Finally, we unify several existing selection algorithms as forms of approximate distance minimization between the selected subset and the query set, and support this view with new generalization bounds. More broadly, our findings provide critical insights and a foundation for more principled data selection in LLM fine-tuning. The code is available at https://github.com/dcml-lab/targeted-instruction-selection.

Adapting Large Language Models (LLMs) to specialized domains requires high-quality instruction tuning datasets, which are expensive to create through human annotation. Existing data synthesis methods focus on general-purpose tasks and fail to capture domain-specific terminology and reasoning patterns. To address this, we introduce DS^2-Instruct, a zero-shot framework that generates domain-specific instruction datasets without human supervision. Our approach first generates task-informed keywords to ensure comprehensive domain coverage. It then creates diverse instructions by pairing these keywords with different cognitive levels from Bloom's Taxonomy. Finally, it uses self-consistency validation to ensure data quality. We apply this framework to generate datasets across seven challenging domains, such as mathematics, finance, and logical reasoning. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that models fine-tuned on our generated data achieve substantial improvements over existing data generation methods.

Instruction tuning enhances large language models (LLMs) to follow human instructions across diverse tasks, relying on high-quality datasets to guide behavior. However, these datasets, whether manually curated or synthetically generated, are often narrowly focused and misaligned with the broad distributions captured during pre-training, limiting LLM generalization and effective use of pre-trained knowledge. We propose Aligning Instruction Tuning with Pre-training (AITP), a method that bridges this gap by identifying coverage shortfalls in instruction-tuning datasets and rewriting underrepresented pre-training data into high-quality instruction-response pairs. This approach enriches dataset diversity while preserving task-specific objectives. Evaluations on three fully open LLMs across eight benchmarks demonstrate consistent performance improvements with AITP. Ablations highlight the benefits of adaptive data selection, controlled rewriting, and balanced integration, emphasizing the importance of aligning instruction tuning with pre-training distributions to unlock the full potential of LLMs.

Instruction tuning has unlocked powerful capabilities in large language models (LLMs), effectively using combined datasets to develop generalpurpose chatbots. However, real-world applications often require a specialized suite of skills (e.g., reasoning). The challenge lies in identifying the most relevant data from these extensive datasets to effectively develop specific capabilities, a setting we frame as targeted instruction tuning. We propose LESS, an optimizer-aware and practically efficient algorithm to effectively estimate data influences and perform Low-rank gradiEnt Similarity Search for instruction data selection. Crucially, LESS adapts existing influence formulations to work with the Adam optimizer and variable-length instruction data. LESS first constructs a highly reusable and transferable gradient datastore with low-dimensional gradient features and then selects examples based on their similarity to few-shot examples embodying a specific capability. Experiments show that training on a LESS-selected 5% of the data can often outperform training on the full dataset across diverse downstream tasks. Furthermore, the selected data is highly transferable: smaller models can be leveraged to select useful data for larger models and models from different families. Our qualitative analysis shows that our method goes beyond surface form cues to identify data that exemplifies the necessary reasoning skills for the intended downstream application.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

We propose LGGPT, an LLM-based model tailored for unified layout generation. First, we propose Arbitrary Layout Instruction (ALI) and Universal Layout Response (ULR) as the uniform I/O template. ALI accommodates arbitrary layout generation task inputs across multiple layout domains, enabling LGGPT to unify both task-generic and domain-generic layout generation hitherto unexplored. Collectively, ALI and ULR boast a succinct structure that forgoes superfluous tokens typically found in existing HTML-based formats, facilitating efficient instruction tuning and boosting unified generation performance. In addition, we propose an Interval Quantization Encoding (IQE) strategy that compresses ALI into a more condensed structure. IQE precisely preserves valid layout clues while eliminating the less informative placeholders, facilitating LGGPT to capture complex and variable layout generation conditions during the unified training process. Experimental results demonstrate that LGGPT achieves superior or on par performance compared to existing methods. Notably, LGGPT strikes a prominent balance between proficiency and efficiency with a compact 1.5B parameter LLM, which beats prior 7B or 175B models even in the most extensive and challenging unified scenario. Furthermore, we underscore the necessity of employing LLMs for unified layout generation and suggest that 1.5B could be an optimal parameter size by comparing LLMs of varying scales. Code is available at https://github.com/NiceRingNode/LGGPT.

We address jailbreaks, backdoors, and unlearning for large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior work, which trains LLMs based on their actions when given malign instructions, our method specifically trains the model to change how it interprets instructions. Our method, Latent Instruction Representation Alignment (LIRA), greatly improves generalization. We further boost generalization through an internally adversarial training algorithm. Our methods block over 99% of PEZ jailbreak attacks; remove a challenging insecure code backdoor; and achieve optimal forgetting on WMDP cyber with negligible loss of benign capabilities.

Large language models~(LLMs) are instruction followers, but it can be challenging to find the best instruction for different situations, especially for black-box LLMs on which backpropagation is forbidden. Instead of directly optimizing the discrete instruction, we optimize a low-dimensional soft prompt applied to an open-source LLM to generate the instruction for the black-box LLM. On each iteration of the proposed method, which we call InstructZero, a soft prompt is converted into an instruction using the open-source LLM, which is then submitted to the black-box LLM for zero-shot evaluation, and the performance is sent to Bayesian optimization to produce new soft prompts improving the zero-shot performance. We evaluate InstructZero on different combinations of open-source LLMs and APIs including Vicuna and ChatGPT. Our results show that InstructZero outperforms SOTA auto-instruction methods across a variety of downstream tasks. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/Lichang-Chen/InstructZero.

Instruction tuning improves the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), with data quality and scalability being the crucial factors. Most instruction tuning data come from human crowd-sourcing or GPT-4 distillation. We propose a paradigm to efficiently harvest 10 million naturally existing instruction data from the pre-training web corpus to enhance LLM reasoning. Our approach involves (1) recalling relevant documents, (2) extracting instruction-response pairs, and (3) refining the extracted pairs using open-source LLMs. Fine-tuning base LLMs on this dataset, we build MAmmoTH2 models, which significantly boost performance on reasoning benchmarks. Notably, MAmmoTH2-7B's (Mistral) performance increases from 11% to 34% on MATH and from 36% to 67% on GSM8K without training on any in-domain data. Further training MAmmoTH2 on public instruction tuning datasets yields MAmmoTH2-Plus, achieving state-of-the-art performance on several reasoning and chatbot benchmarks. Our work demonstrates how to harvest large-scale, high-quality instruction data without costly human annotation or GPT-4 distillation, providing a new paradigm for building better instruction tuning data.

Existing visual instruction tuning methods typically prompt large language models with textual descriptions to generate instruction-following data. Despite the promising performance achieved, these descriptions are derived from image annotations, which are oftentimes coarse-grained. Furthermore, the instructions might even contradict the visual content without observing the entire visual context. To address this challenge, we introduce a fine-grained visual instruction dataset, LVIS-Instruct4V, which contains 220K visually aligned and context-aware instructions produced by prompting the powerful GPT-4V with images from LVIS. Through experimental validation and case studies, we demonstrate that high-quality visual instructional data could improve the performance of LLaVA-1.5, a state-of-the-art large multimodal model, across a wide spectrum of benchmarks by clear margins. Notably, by simply replacing the LLaVA-Instruct with our LVIS-Instruct4V, we achieve better results than LLaVA on most challenging LMM benchmarks, e.g., LLaVA^w (76.7 vs. 70.7) and MM-Vet (40.2 vs. 35.4). We release our data and model at https://github.com/X2FD/LVIS-INSTRUCT4V.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Tool selection is a key component of LLM agents. A popular approach follows a two-step process - retrieval and selection - to pick the most appropriate tool from a tool library for a given task. In this work, we introduce ToolHijacker, a novel prompt injection attack targeting tool selection in no-box scenarios. ToolHijacker injects a malicious tool document into the tool library to manipulate the LLM agent's tool selection process, compelling it to consistently choose the attacker's malicious tool for an attacker-chosen target task. Specifically, we formulate the crafting of such tool documents as an optimization problem and propose a two-phase optimization strategy to solve it. Our extensive experimental evaluation shows that ToolHijacker is highly effective, significantly outperforming existing manual-based and automated prompt injection attacks when applied to tool selection. Moreover, we explore various defenses, including prevention-based defenses (StruQ and SecAlign) and detection-based defenses (known-answer detection, DataSentinel, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection). Our experimental results indicate that these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies.